Formations, formations, formations

There is always much debate about a team’s formation. Last season, we started with a basic 4-4-2, before a switch to a 4-5-1 helped solidify the team and was very effective in keeping us up. This season, we opened with a 4-4-2, switched to 4-2-3-1 and now seem to be set on 4-4-2 again. There is a (incorrect) belief amongst people that 4-4-2 is automatically a more attacking formation than a 4-5-1. This is rubbish - the formation doesn’t set the mentality, the players used and the roles that the manager gives the players do this. It’s just as easy to play a negative 4-4-2 as it is to play an advanced, attacking 4-5-1.

4-4-2

This has long been the formation of choice in the Premier League, yet the flat midfield-4 seems to have gone out of fashion on the International scene and in European competition. Villarreal play a 4-2-2-2, similar to how Fulham played against us earlier in the season. This can be very effective as the front four players are all very difficult to pick up, but relies on the fullbacks pushing forward and the forwards drifting to the flanks to give the team width. However, the double pivot in front of the back-4 gives those fullbacks the protection they need.

Anyway, we wouldn’t play that sort of formation as we rely on width – no team has crossed the ball into the penalty area more than we have this season. However, a 4-4-2 can deny a team width; if both wide men hug the touchline, the midfield becomes too spread out, so the natural inclination for both is to tuck in. This, of course negates Matt Jarvis who is so effective if you can get him one-on-one with the opposing fullback. In addition, the central midfields can lack support, with no link player playing between the lines. This often means that the only options the midfielder has is to try and force the ball past the opposition midfield into a tightly marked striker, or play it back to the defence. This, and the fact that there are two strikers up there, often leads to teams playing it long into the channels for the two forwards to challenge for.

However, 4-4-2 can be a devastatingly effective tactic. We saw in the 1-0 win at Anfield both teams playing 4-4-2, which effectively meant there were 10 individual battles across the pitch. Our superior desire and effort meant that we won the majority of those battles and so were able to take the game. At Molineux though, Liverpool played a 4-2-3-1 formation, giving them the extra man in midfield. This meant that Raul Meireles often had space between the lines and produced a man of the match performance. Against Chelsea, we used a 4-4-2 with the two forwards being used very effectively to pressure the Chelsea defence, especially in the first half. The difference with the Liverpool game was that Chelsea’s spare man in midfield was Michael Essien, who playing the holding role was unwilling to leave his two central defenders in a two v two situation and so didn’t make the use of the space. Had McCarthy withdrawn a forward, Essien would have been free to roam forward and would surely have put our defence under far more pressure. McCarthy won this game of brinkmanship with Ancelotti.

4-5-1

For the sake of this argument, I’m going to count 4-5-1 as a 4-2-3-1 as well. The major problem with this formation is that it can leave the lone forward isolated. This happened in the last few months of last season, where a midfield of Jarvis, Jones, Mancienne, Henry and Foley was never going to have players running past Kevin Doyle in support. This season though, it’s been a different question. The games at Stamford Bridge and against Manchester City at Molineux highlighted this beautifully. Playing Jarvis and Stephen Hunt on the flanks, with David Edwards through the middle meant that we had midfield support when defending, yet also had plenty of support for Doyle. Unfortunately, we suffered through losing Edwards to injury, especially as our other midfielder capable of playing that role (Adlene Guedioura) is out with a broken leg. Without that midfield runner, this formation becomes stagnant and fairly easy to defend against.

Another reason this formation has had success is that it allows Nenad Milijaš to flourish. Contrary to belief, Milijaš is not an attacking midfielder, he needs to play deeper, collecting the ball from the midfield and dictating play from there. When he plays further forward, he is easy to defend against, when he runs from deep, he can arrive late on the scene as seen to great effect in the Manchester City home match. The 3-man midfield gives the team slightly more solidity, so Milijaš, and especially Jarvis can play with greater freedom. Jarvis seems to thrive on this, providing he tracks the run of his fullback he can basically do whatever he wants, especially with the workaholic Hunt on the other flank.

This formation is also a more effective when wanting to keep the ball on the ground. The defence has options in front of it, and there are plenty of angles for the midfielders to find passes. The double pivot in front of the defence gives the fullbacks chance that they can push forward, safe in the knowledge that there’s cover behind them and that there’s less chance of the ball being lost. However, this formation only works with the midfield runner supporting the striker. At the moment, we don’t really have one, although I have long been calling for Hunt to be played in this role as I think he would be extremely effective there. Maybe the addition of Adam Hammill will allow Hunt to be shifted inside, or even play Hammill there himself.

Neither formation is perfect and I don’t think we should have a set formation and play to that. Each match should be viewed on its own in terms of both formation and personnel. After just a few minutes of the Liverpool match last week, it was plainly obvious that they would dominate us in midfield and so it happened. I don’t necessarily think that McCarthy is that bad a tactician, but he is extremely reluctant to change the starting shape. It could easily have been changed last week by something as simple as dropping Steven Fletcher slightly deeper to pick up Lucas, allowing Milijaš and Karl Henry to deal with Christian Poulsen and Meireles. It may have made a difference, it may not have, but McCarthy’s reluctance to change denied us any chance of getting a result.